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Abstract 
Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators and thus to further 
company goals by encouraging favorable policies and/or outcomes. Using data made 
available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, this study examines corporate lobbying 
activities from a financial perspective. We find that on average, lobbying is positively 
related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust 
across a number of empirical specifications and continue to hold when we account for 
potential sample selection. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio 
approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly 
outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread disagreement over the impact of corporate political activity in the 
United States. One widely held view is that corporate interests unduly influence the regulatory 
and legislative processes, mainly via their ability to spend large sums of money. Academic 
studies however, have yet to reach a strong consensus. Early studies, e.g., Snyder (1992), 
consider whether political contributions affect legislative voting outcomes. Snyder concludes 
that “despite years of research by political scientists and economists, the extent to which 
money actually buys political influence on a regular basis remains a mystery.” With hindsight, 
it is clear that links to voting outcomes can easily become obscured, by e.g., complex omnibus 
legislation – where many unrelated pieces of legislation get combined, or by the inability to 
observe behind the scenes maneuvering by politicians themselves. Given these difficulties, this 
study focuses instead on the relation between corporate lobbying activities and corporate 
financial performance. 
Generally speaking, corporate political interests can be communicated in one of two 
ways: either through lobbying, or through donations to politicians, political parties, or interest 
groups. Recently, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) argue that there need not be 
a relationship between donations and corporate performance. They point out that most so-
called “corporate” contributions are actually made by individuals, and not by corporations 
themselves.1 Hence, in their view such donations should be considered personal consumption 
in advancing a personal political ideology, rather than as a form of corporate political 
                                                 
1 The two primary categories of corporate political donations are Political Action Committee (PAC) donations, 
and the now-banned ‘Soft money’ donations. Soft money refers to largely unregulated contributions made to a 
political party for “party building” activities rather than for the direct support of particular candidates and 
campaigns. Soft-money contributions were banned in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. PACs are 
specifically organized to elect political candidates. By law, corporations are prohibited from contributing to PACs, 
but may pay the administrative costs of affiliated PACs. Such affiliated PACs may only solicit contributions from 
corporate executives, shareholders, and their families.  
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involvement. This point is well taken, since legally, direct corporate political contributions are 
prohibited by the Tillman Act. Despite the logic of this personal/corporate distinction, recent 
evidence suggests that corporations do benefit from Political Action Committee (PAC) 
activities. For example, Jayachandran (2006) finds that the surprise change in political parties 
by Senator Jeffords (in 2001) cost firms that contributed (via PACs) to the Republicans nearly 
1% of market value in the subsequent week. More recently, in a comprehensive study of PAC 
contributions, Cooper, Gulen and Ovtchinnikov (2007) find that firms with affiliated PACs 
outperform non-contributing firms.2  
Surprisingly, studies of corporate lobbying – a much more common form of corporate 
political involvement – are notably absent from this debate. The purpose of this study is to fill 
this void. We measure corporate lobbying by expenditure totals as disclosed in legally required 
U.S. Senate filings, and we focus solely on the financial implications of such expenditures.3 
We provide evidence from reported financial statement data (accounting performance), as well 
as from stock market returns (market performance). Added motivation for this study is 
provided by recent research into the financial implications of corporate connections with 
politicians. These studies conclude that connected firms receive specific benefits from political 
connections, and importantly, that the value of these connections is priced by the market.4  
                                                 
2 Aggarwal, Meschke & Wang (2008), however reach the opposite conclusion.  
3 Recent news stories citing lobbying financial benefits include The Washington Post (2006) reporting that 60 
companies (including Pfizer, Hewlett Packard and Altria) collectively spent approximately $1.6 million dollars 
lobbying for a special low tax rate worth $100 billion dollars, which would apply to the firms’ earnings from 
foreign operations. The same article quoted the case of Carmen Group Inc., a lobbying services firm claiming to 
deliver a 100 to 1 (dollar) benefit-to-cost ratio for its clients. Similarly, Fortune (2006) estimated similarly large 
rates of return on political investment: 163,536% for Lockheed Martin, which spent $55 million in lobbying since 
1999 and won roughly $90 billion in defense contracts; and 142,000% for Boeing, which spent $57 million and 
got $81 billion in contracts. 
4 Recent studies find that political connections lead to better access to finance, and/or lower taxation, government 
bailouts, higher market returns, more government contracts, and greater market share, e.g., Claessens, Feijen, and 
Laeven (2008), Faccio (2006), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), and 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008b). In contrast, Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that politically connected 
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We begin our empirical investigation by examining the links between corporate 
lobbying and corporate performance using financial statement data via panel regression 
methods. Initially, we apply the approach taken by researchers studying the value of R&D 
expenditures (e.g., Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). We examine three measures 
of performance released in firms’ financial statements: income before extraordinary items, net 
income, and operating cash flows. The evidence points to a positive relationship between 
corporate lobbying expenditures and accounting earnings and cash flows from operation. We 
attempt to deal with several potential limitations of the analysis, including self-selection bias, 
non-linearity in the relationship, and principal agent interpretations, via sub-sample regressions 
(limiting to large lobbying spenders only, and firms with weak investor protection only), and 
by modeling the decision to lobby in a treatment effects framework.  
After these robustness exercises, we turn to an analysis of market based evidence 
comparing excess returns of portfolios of lobbying and non-lobbying firms. We follow the 
portfolio approach used by Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) who study the stock 
market valuation of R&D expenditures. One benefit of this portfolio-based approach is that it 
partly mitigates concerns about reverse causality, since the focus of the analysis is on future 
(i.e., one-, two-, and three-year ahead) excess returns. Presumably, forecasts of future 
performance at these horizons are highly unreliable. We find that lobbying intensity (defined 
as lobbying relative to size or sales) is positively correlated with future excess returns. In 
particular, firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their 
benchmarks. However, our results also imply that most lobbying expenditures are not 
associated with abnormal returns, and that simply spending the most on lobbying does not 
                                                                                                                                                          
Chinese firms have poorer financial performance. Interestingly, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008a), conclude that 
corporate donations are a less reliable predictor of future returns than are politically connected board members. 
See also Snyder (1990). 
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necessarily lead to better financial performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses in the 
context of related research. Section 3 describes the data and how we arrive at our final sample. 
Section 4 discusses the research design and presents the results of the analysis. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. BACKGROUND  
By definition, lobbying activities can include direct, explicit effort in communicating 
with lawmakers to influence their opinions, as well as grass roots activities aiming to solicit 
general support for, or to indirectly create a favorable public environment for a desired 
legislative goal. Direct lobbying of politicians can target different levels of government such as 
the federal government or the state government. In this paper, we focus on direct lobbying at 
the federal level, which is defined as “any communication made on behalf of a client to 
members of Congress, congressional staffers, the President, White House staff and high-level 
employees of nearly 200 agencies, regarding the formulation, modification, or adoption of 
legislation.” (The Center for Public Integrity).   
As noted in the introduction, it is surprising that empirical research has so far ignored 
the financial implications of corporate lobbying.5 First, lobbying is the largest form of 
corporate political involvement in America. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying is roughly 
twenty times greater than either PAC, or soft-money contributions per election cycle.6 
Moreover, corporations, their trade associations, and other business-related interest groups 
                                                 
5 The one exception we are aware of is Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008), who examine the 
financial returns to firms that lobbied against the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. There are however, frequent news 
stories suggesting substantial benefits from corporate lobbying for particular firms, e.g., The Washington Post 
(2006), and Fortune (2006).  
6 The numbers of firms that lobby is also much larger (between two and four times) than those contributing via 
PACs or soft-monies (see Table 2).  
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account for nearly all the money spent on lobbying.7 Individual firms also spend impressive 
amounts annually. According to the data reported in Table I, lobbying spending by the top 
twenty firms was more than $160 million in 2005, with the top five firms accounting for 42% 
of the total. General Electric alone spent more than $18 million, and Altria Group (which 
includes Kraft and Philip Morris) spent nearly $14 million in that year.8  
The lack of attention to corporate lobbying is also surprising since lobbying has direct 
budgetary consequences, unlike political donations or contributions. Given that control over 
lobbying funds resides with the firm’s managers, decisions concerning lobbying activities are 
presumably subject to the same cost/benefit calculus as other corporate spending decisions.9 
Finally, and perhaps more relevant, is that according to the Center for Responsive Politics, 
there is very little correlation between campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures by 
businesses or industries.10 Thus, inferences reached from studies of corporate donations may 
lack generality. 
Despite these arguments, lobbying by corporations, and contributions by affiliated 
individuals, are similar to other forms of corporate political connections in that the links to 
financial performance are not always straightforward. Hence, throughout this study we take 
precautions to insure our results are robust to various alternative interpretations for our 
findings.  
                                                 
7 Milyo, Primo and Groseclose (2000) report that these groups accounted for roughly 90% of total lobbying 
spending in the 1997-98 election cycle. 
8 For GE and Altria these numbers are relatively small, however in comparison to typical campaign spending, 
they are significant. For example, the average two-year election cycle spending by winning candidates for U.S. 
House and Senate seats (in the 2004 election) was $1 million and $7.8 million respectively.  
9 A conceptual difference between lobbying and contributions is that contributions have the appearance of buying 
favor; hence one could argue that an examination of contributions is where one should look for an effect. 
However, this intuition misses the point that donation monies are not transfers in the traditional sense, i.e., they 
may only be used for professional (e.g., re-election), but not for personal, uses. Therefore the ‘pay-for-service’ 
analogy may be misleading. 
10 On its web site the Center for Responsive Politics describes itself as a “nonpartisan, independent and nonprofit” 
organization that compiles data and reports on campaign contributions and lobbying. Their discussion of lobbying 
versus contributions tradeoffs can be found at: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/lobby00/summary.php. 
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One important example is that lobbying may be based on expected future profitability. 
However, we note that the effects can go either way. That is, firms expecting financial 
performance to improve may increase their lobbying efforts; thus creating a positive link 
between lobbying and subsequent performance. Alternatively, firms may increase spending 
when expected future profits drop in an effort to mitigate that decline. This concern suggests 
the importance of controlling for factors that influence future financial performance. In 
addition, it suggests that managers with more discretion might be more able to engage in such 
‘opportunistic’ lobbying. However, in our data we find little correlation between commonly 
used corporate governance scores and lobbying. Finally, as noted above, we also take two 
additional empirical approaches to dealing with this potential endogeneity. First, we present 
estimates from a treatment-effects model, where the decision to lobby is estimated 
simultaneously with the effects of lobbying, and second, we use a portfolio analysis to 
compare market returns of lobbying and non-lobbying firms based on the intensity of their 
lobbying efforts. This approach helps to mitigate concerns that managers’ prior knowledge (of 
future performance) affects their decision to lobby by examining returns for several years 
subsequent to portfolio formation. 
The theoretical basis for this study relies on research in the political economy of 
business and regulation such as Stigler (1971).11 In Stigler’s view the state, through its power 
to tax, subsidize, and regulate, can selectively help or hurt particular firms or industries. He 
discusses several specific forms of government influence, including: subsidies and earmarks 
(by e.g., veterans, airlines, and universities); control over entry or rivals (e.g., commercial 
airline authority, and, entry into banking); and import tariffs. According to Stigler, lobbying 
                                                 
11 Another prominent contribution to political economy theory is Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001) is related, 
though focuses primarily on contributions, rather than lobbying per se. 
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can generate positive returns for firms by any one (or a combination) of several means: 
securing direct subsidies or lower taxes, government contracts, limiting competition, or 
permitting entry into previously protected markets. However, we note that lobbying may also 
be undertaken to express opposition to potentially damaging legislation or regulation, rather 
than to advocate for firm-specific favorable policies. Hence, the question of which effect 
dominates is ultimately empirical. 
A closely related line of research focuses on valuing firms’ political connections. In 
addition to the studies noted above by Jayachandran (2006) and Cooper, Gulen and 
Ovtchinnikov (2007), Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) show that firms that need political 
connections (such as those facing intense competition or contracting with the government) tend 
to have outside board directors with political backgrounds. Fisman (2001) uses evidence from 
Indonesia to show political connections are valuable for firms. He demonstrates that the market 
value of firms connected to the Suharto family changed significantly when news about 
Suharto’s health was announced. Faccio (2006) examines international firms with controlling 
shareholders or top managers who have political positions. She finds that politically-connected 
firms enjoy privileges such as easy access to debt financing and low taxation, as well as high 
market share. Faccio and Parsley (2009) find an economically meaningful 1.7% decline in firm 
value (averaged across American and international firms) after the sudden deaths of politicians 
that resided, or were born, in the same geographic location as the firms’ headquarters. 
Interestingly, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008a) find that corporate donations are a less 
reliable predictor of future returns than are politically connected board members.  
Similarly, a number of researchers in political science and economics have studied 
lobbying. Hansen and Mitchell (2000) count the number of corporate representatives 
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(including consultants or corporate council offices) in Washington D.C. in 1988, and compare 
‘lobbying activities’ of domestic and foreign firms. De Figueiredo and Tiller (2001) study the 
number of contacts to the Federal Communications Commission as a proxy for firms’ lobbying 
effort. Their findings are generally consistent with the prediction of collective-action and 
transaction cost theories in that large firms tend to lobby more.12 More recently, de Figueiredo 
and Silverman (2006) measure the success of lobbying efforts made by universities seeking 
educational earmarks. They find that a lobbying university with representatives in the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (SAC) can obtain an average of 11 to 17 dollars on every dollar 
they spend lobbying, and that a university with representation on the House Appropriations 
Committee (HAC) can obtain $20-$36 for each lobbying dollar. Finally, Yu and Yu (2006) 
examine the relation between corporate lobbying expenses and fraud detection. They find 
firms that lobby can evade fraud detection on average 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely 
to be detected by regulators than firms that do not. Also, fraudulent firms spend 77% more on 
lobbying than firms not involved in fraud. However, to our knowledge, this is the first study to 
examine the connection between corporate lobbying, quantified by the dollar amount of 
lobbying expenses, and corporate financial performance.  
 
3. DATA 
We obtain lobbying data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), financial data 
from COMPUSTAT, and returns and pricing data from CRSP. The Lobbying Disclosure Act 
of 1995 established the registration and reporting requirements for those who seek to affect 
U.S. government policies or the implementation of Federal programs. Registrants must file 
                                                 
12 The central theme of the collective action problem (Olson, 1965) is that smaller (poorer) entities will (rationally) 
free ride on the efforts of larger entities in providing public goods. Thus, to the extent that lobbying generates 
non-excludable benefits, larger firms will incur a disproportionate share of the costs of lobbying. 
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semi-annual reports (within 30 days of the end of the semi-annual period) detailing the issue 
they lobby for and the amount spent.13 The CRP data includes lobbying, PAC contributions, 
and soft-money as distinct categories. It is compiled using the semi-annual lobbying disclosure 
reports filed with the Secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records and is available by 
calendar year since 1998.  
The CRP sums the mid-year and year-end total amounts of expenses reported by a 
registrant to arrive at annual figures for each firm. Adjustments are made if there are any 
subsequent amendment reports correcting the originally reported amount in either the mid-year 
or year-end filings. Lobbying can be done in-house, and/or via a contractual arrangement with 
external lobbyists to lobby on a firm’s behalf. These external lobbyists must report for whom 
they lobby. The CRP uses the amount reported by the organization (including both in-house 
lobbying and external lobbyist filings) as the total lobbying expenditure for the period. Thus, 
even if an organization does not file for lobbying itself (e.g., because it has no in-house 
lobbying), the CRP sums all of the organization’s contracted lobbying expenditures reported 
by its external lobbyists. Finally, when a parent firm and its subsidiary both file for lobbying, 
the CRP attributes all lobbying expenses to the parent firm.14  
The CRP lobbying data include spending by publicly traded firms, privately held firms, 
trade associations, ideological organizations, and non-profit organizations. We merge the data 
with COMPUSTAT to extract only public firms. Since CRP does not use company identifiers 
(e.g., CUSIP, PERMNO, etc.), we manually verified the names of the public firms to ensure 
the matching between COMPUSTAT and CRP lobbying data.  
                                                 
13 Typically, issues are very general, e.g., “Lobby for business and workforce development programs and 
appropriations”. The CRP provides a considerable service by sifting, matching, and cleaning the raw lobbying 
disclosure data. To access the Senate lobby reports and registrations database, go to http://sopr.senate.gov.  
14 See http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/methodology.asp for more details about the CRP’s methodology. 
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Table II compares the three categories of corporate political involvement for firms in 
COMPUSTAT that lobbied during 1998 to 2005. The relative magnitudes of lobbying, PAC 
contributions, and soft money donations are reported. Note that both PAC and soft money are 
reported by election cycle rather than calendar year. As seen in Table II, the percentage of 
firms in COMPUSTAT involving in lobbying activities increases from 6.54% in 1998 to 
11.79% in 2005. Clearly, lobbying accounts for the lion’s share (in both dollar amounts and in 
the number of firms involved) among all types of corporate political expenditures.15 If we 
compare the average firm’s political spending across the three categories (by aggregating 
lobbying expenses per year into amounts per election cycle to match the reported PAC and soft 
money) in the 1998 election cycle, for instance, we see that lobbying is around 22 times greater 
than PAC contributions, and around 20 times greater than soft-money contributions.16 All three 
types of spending increase across the sample, though soft money is relatively constant in the 
final two election cycles of its existence (i.e., 2000 and 2002). Figure 1 presents the total and 
average annual lobbying spending of sample firms in Panels A and B, respectively. The figure 
confirms that much of the growth in lobbying expenditures is due to additional firms, since the 
per-firm average has increased by only around $40,000 since 2000. 
In Table III, we look across industry group and year. Firms in manufacturing (two-digit 
SIC=20-39), transportation and utilities (two-digit SIC=40-49), and finance, insurance and real 
estate industries (two-digit SIC=60-69) are more active in lobbying activities than are other 
firms, evident by the average lobbying spending. The public administration industry (two-digit 
                                                 
15 If we restrict the sample to only those firms engaged in all three forms of political involvement, the number of 
firms falls below 200 (or roughly one-third of the full sample), and the resulting sample spends on average nearly 
three times more on lobbying than in the full sample. In our regression analysis we do not restrict the sample to 
just these firms. 
16 Total lobbying spending of our sample firms in the 1998 election cycle is $789,391,490 
(=704*$554,628+765*521,482) and the amount of PAC contributions is $36,385,753 (=430*$84,618). 
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SIC=90-99) has the highest average lobby spending among all the industry groups, however, 
there are relatively few firms in public administration involved in lobbying in most years, and 
most of these firms are conglomerates. These differences suggest to us the importance of 
controlling for industry effects in our analysis.  
To ensure that the lobbying data and financial data correspond to the same time period, 
we focus our analysis on firms with fiscal year ending December 31. Our sample of lobbying 
firms is reduced from 6,678 to 4,668 firm-year observations due to the elimination of firms 
with non-calendar fiscal year end.  
Panels A and B of Table IV report descriptive statistics for the various measures of 
accounting performance, lobbying, and other independent variables used in our analysis. Panel 
A focuses on firms that lobby, and Panel B reports data for all firms in COMPUSTAT. The 
most obvious conclusion from comparing Panel A with Panel B is that firms with non-zero 
lobbying spending are, on average, substantially larger. 
 
4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
4.a. Lobbying activities and financial performance  
In this section we check whether, on average, lobbying and financial performance are 
positively related. In these regressions we relate financial performance to lobbying after 
controlling for additional firm characteristics standard in this literature, including market-to-
book ratios, lagged financial performance, and firm size (assets). All our regressions include 
Fama-French (Fama and French 1997) industry-dummies, time-dummies, and we report z-
statistics for coefficient estimates computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors 
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that are clustered at the firm level.17 
To guide our empirical specifications, we draw from studies investigating the impact of 
R&D expenditures on financial performance. Conceptually, lobbying is similar to R&D in that 
each is undertaken voluntarily by (not all) individual firms, and yields uncertain future payoffs. 
Although these charges are fully expensed in the financial statements in the period in which 
they incur, the implications for performance may only be in subsequent years. In Table V we 
examine three standard measures of firm performance taken from firms’ financial statements, 
and we present several econometric specifications for each measure. Our three econometric 
specifications parallel those developed in Sougiannis (1994), Amir and Lev (1996), and Lev 
and Sougiannis (1996). The general approach has also been used in other contexts, e.g., by 
Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (1999). Hence, Table V presents a total of nine regressions (three 
econometric specifications for each measure of financial performance).  
Specifically, in columns (1) - (3), we use income before extraordinary items (IBEI) as 
the measure of financial performance. We choose income before extraordinary items instead of 
other earnings measures, such as income before interest, income tax, and depreciation and 
amortization, because lobbying activities may affect lobbying firms’ effective tax rates and 
interest rates. In columns (4) - (6), we repeat the analysis using net income (NI), and in 
columns (7) - (9), we use cash from operations (CFO) as alternative financial performance 
measures. Using IBEI as an example, the general form of the specifications we study is: 18  
IBEIi,t = α0 + 1β LOBBYi,t-1 + α2MBi,t + α3 ASSETi,t + 

2
1k
k IBEIi,t-k  
+ 

2004
1998t
t Yeart +

48
1j
j Industryj + εj,t, (1a) 
                                                 
17 See Moulton (1986) on the consequences of ignoring intragroup error correlation. 
18 Specifications including firm fixed effects produce qualitatively similar results.  
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IBEIi,t = α0 + 1β LOBBYi,t-1  + α2MBi,t + α3 ASSETi,t + 

2
1k
k IBEIi,t-k  
+ 

2004
1998t
t Yeart +

48
1j
j Industryj + εj,t, (1b) 
IBEIi,t = α0 + 1β LOBBYi,t-1  + α2MBi,t + α3 ASSETi,t + 

2
1k
k IBEIi,t-k  
+ 

2004
1998t
t Yeart +

48
1j
j Industryj + εj,t, (1c) 
 
where “∆” indicates the change from year t-1 to year t. LOBBYi,t is the dollar amount of 
lobbying spending by firm i, in year t. Firms that do not lobby are assigned a zero for the value 
of their lobbying expenses. ASSETi,t is the amount of total assets of firm i at the beginning of 
year t; and Year and Industry are year and Fama-French industry dummies. Two lags of the 
dependent variable are included in each specification to mitigate potential problems from serial 
correlation. Using three lags of the dependent variable produces similar results, though with a 
smaller sample size. To control for firm specific drivers of financial performance, we include 
the firm’s market-to-book ratio (MB), size (ASSET), and the previous two year’s financial 
performance (e.g., ∆IBEIi,t-1), time (Year), as well as industry (Industry) fixed effects.  
 To summarize, our empirical strategy in Table V is to check whether lobbying and 
financial performance are statistically significantly related. We present three econometric 
specifications for robustness.  Equation (1a) relates current lobbying to future performance. 
Equation (1b) checks whether lobbying is related to the change in financial performance. 
Finally, equation (1c) presents the first-differenced estimate of equation (1a). 
We report the results of estimating these equations using all firms in COMPUSTAT. 
To mitigate the impact of outliers, we have repeated these regressions excluding observations 
in the top and bottom 1 percent of the dependent variable. Focusing on IBEI, according to 
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columns (1) and (2), lobbying is positively related to financial performance and the change in 
financial performance. In column (3), the coefficient on the lagged change in lobbying is 
positive but not statistically significant. The R2 statistic is much higher for column (1), which 
relates the flow of lobbying resources to the income flow, as opposed to changes in these flows 
in columns (2) and (3). The coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable are generally 
statistically significant in equation implying persistence in financial performance. The 
coefficient on the level of assets (ASSET), is statistically significant in all three specifications 
suggesting that size effects are important; however, the market to book ratio (MB) is never 
statistically significant. 
The results from estimating equations (1a) - (1c) for net income (NI), and cash from 
operations (CFO), are presented in columns (4) – (6), and (7) – (9), respectively and generally 
mirror the results using IBEI as the measure of financial performance.19  
 
4.b. Additional Robustness Exercises 
One drawback to the analysis so far is that it makes no distinction between firms 
lobbying for defensive reasons and firms that lobby for preemptive reasons. For example, 
some corporate lobbying may be undertaken to express opposition to potentially damaging 
legislation or regulation (defensive), rather than to advocate for specific favorable policies 
(preemptive), e.g., securing direct government contracts, or advocating tariffs on competitors’ 
products, etc. Empirically, a successful defensive outcome may simply be limiting the costs of 
unfavorable policies.20 Mixing defensive and preemptive lobbying in a single regression would 
                                                 
19 We also repeated this analysis with LOBBY variable scaled by assets and sales, the results are qualitatively 
similar.   
20 For our sample, we searched the Nexis© electronic data base for news stories involving the firms most actively 
lobbying in our sample (spending relative to assets), and found stories of both types of lobbying. Examples of 
preemptive lobbying include: lobbying to secure and keep government contracts (e.g., Alliant Techsystems, 
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lessen the average correlation between lobbying and financial performance. Though we do not 
know the specific motivations behind the observed lobbying expenditures, there may be 
threshold effects, whereby the relationship changes when lobbying expenditures become very 
large. 
To check for this sort of nonlinearity, we repeat these regressions focusing on the 
highest quartile of lobbying firms. The question is whether the positive association is being 
driven only by the firms that spend the most on lobbying. These results (Appendix Table 1) are 
virtually identical to those presented in Table V. Hence, the positive association between 
lobbying and firm performance does not seem any more or less prevalent for the firms with the 
largest lobbying expenses.  
There are several additional concerns that should be addressed before going further. 
These concerns make the interpretation of the positive regression coefficients difficult, in that 
the coefficient on lobbying may be proxying for something else. We discuss each of these in 
turn.  
First, lobbying could be correlated with an unobserved variable, e.g., government 
connections, which may be the real source of value to the firm. Should this be the case, the 
firm would lobby for issues or legislation the connected politician supports, in return for 
political favors. As a result, both the firm and the government official benefit from the 
lobbying activity, but the government connection is the true underlying cause. Unfortunately, 
we have no way to address this identification issue, since to do so we would need – at the least 
– to be able to identify a substantial subset of all firm/politician connections, which is beyond 
                                                                                                                                                          
Armor Holdings, Cray); for stricter software piracy laws (Autodesk); for greater Medicare reimbursement 
(Celgene); and, for direct items in appropriations bills (Shaw Group). Defensive lobbying examples include: 
successful lobbying to limit state laws with greater consumer protection (Cephalon); and, lobbying to defeat a 
proposed effort to increase the Federal government’s ability to negotiate prices for Medicare (Cephalon).   
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the scope of the present paper. However, since we cannot rule out additional political 
connections, the possibility remains that lobbying is picking up some unobserved source for 
the observed positive effect.  
A second concern is that there could be an agency problem whereby managers having 
relatively high discretion tend to lobby most.21 The agency problem is another way reverse 
causation can complicate the interpretation of our results in Table V; in particular, the reported 
relationship might be masking the underlying relationship between managerial discretion and 
expected future firm performance. Specifically, managers with relatively high discretion over 
the decision to lobby may increase lobbying spending whenever they expect firm performance 
to be good. This alternative hypothesis implies that lobbying does not add value to the firm. 
Hence, we should observe a weaker relationship between lobbying and firm performance, or 
even a reversal in the estimated coefficient, for firms with weaker corporate governance 
characteristics.  
To investigate this possibility we examine two widely used measures of corporate 
governance. The first measure, used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), attempts to 
measure shareholder rights across a large cross-section of U.S. firms. The second measure, 
produced by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009), is designed to measure manager 
entrenchment comparatively over a similarly broad set of U.S. corporations. Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) propose their “E-index” measure as an improvement over that proposed by Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick. Both measures use underlying data from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center. As a start, we first checked the simple correlation of lobbying expenditures 
with these two measures. Empirically, the correlation coefficient is below 0.20 for our sample 
                                                 
21 For example, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) suggest managers could engage firms in political activities for their 
own personal political or ideological agenda. 
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of firms and years. Hence, a priori, there seems little to suggest that our results depend on 
corporate governance characteristics. However, we still test the agency hypothesis directly by 
comparing the relations between lobbying and financial performance in the context of our 
regression framework.  
Appendix Table 2 presents the results using the E-index measure developed in Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrel (2009).22 As in the case of firms with the largest lobbying expenditures, we 
repeat our regression analysis by focusing on firms with the weakest investor protection, i.e., 
those with an E-index in the top quartile. As can be seen from the table, the results are 
generally consistent across all 9 specifications, though the coefficients on lobbying in the 
regressions focusing on cash from operations lose statistical significance.  All other 
coefficients are of similar magnitudes and significance levels.  Thus the results do not support 
the hypothesis that lobbying is undertaken by firms with weak investor protection as a means 
for managers to ‘consume.’  
A third concern is the possibility of self-selection, which the results in Table V do not 
account for. That is, what the results do not tell us is whether lobbying induces better financial 
performance or whether firms lobby based on a belief that such efforts would be productive. 
To the extent that there is a distinction between firms that know, or have reason to believe, that 
lobbying spending is likely to have a positive impact, and firms that know or believe lobbying 
will be unproductive, then the results in Table V lack generality. As a result, our variable of 
interest (lobbying spending) is correlated with the error term, causing OLS estimates to be 
biased. We note that our specifications in Table V partially address this in two ways; first by 
examining lagged effects of lobbying (i.e., the ‘future’ in this case refers to at least two years 
                                                 
22 Their data is available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml   
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hence), and second, by examining both levels and changes in firm performance.  
However, to address this issue more fully, we model this self-selection via a treatment 
effects model consisting of two equations. In the first regression, the probability of ‘treatment’ 
(lobbying) is estimated using a probit specification. That is, in equation (2a), the probability of 
lobbying, PR(LOBBY), is given as a function of the other independent variables in the firm 
performance regressions (e.g., ASSET, lagged dependent variables, industry and time dummies) 
as well as industry level variables: Import Sharej, the share of imports in industry j (as of 1994); 
Import Growthj, the growth in imports over the longest interval for which we have available 
data (1958-1994);and, #Lobbyingj,t-1, the number of firms in industry j lobbying in year t-1. 23 
The variables Import Share, Import Growth, and #Lobbying, are included as possible 
predictors of lobbying by firm i, but outside firm i’s direct influence. We measure imports and 
import growth in industry j prior to our sample period (1998-2005) in order to make the 
identifying restriction more credible. The number of firms lobbying in industry j is also 
measured one year prior to date t in the regressions. For robustness, we have also modeled the 
probability of lobbying as a function of each of these three variables separately, and we have 
also included (not reported) a measure of industry concentration, calculated as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of every firm in the industry.24 Our results are similar across all of 
these permutations. 
The second equation in the treatment effects model includes the estimated probability 
(from the probit estimation) as another independent variable; thus the treatment is modeled as 
                                                 
23 Imports by sector are described in Robert Feenstra (1996), and the data are available at: 
http://www.internationaldata.org/usixd/usixd4sic.html. Import growth is the share of imports in SIC 4-digit sector 
i in 1994 (the last year available in Feenstra), relative to that in 1958, or the earliest year available. Import share is 
the share of imports in each SIC 4-digit sector relative to total industry shipments in 1994. A complete description 
of the data is at http://www.internationaldata.org/notes/sicdescription.html. 
24 For example, if there were only one firm in the industry, that firm would have 100% market share and the 
Herfindahl index would be equal to 10,000, the maximum possible value of the Herfindahl index. Reports using 
the Herfindahl index are available from the authors. 
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an omitted relevant variable in the original specification. The two equations are estimated 
simultaneously by maximum likelihood, and (using IBEI as the measure of financial 
performance) are described by equations (2a) and (2b).  
PR(LOBBYi,t-1) = β0 + α2MBi,t + α3 Import Sharej + α4 Import Growthj + α5 
#Lobbyingj,t-1 + α6 ASSETi,t + 

2
1k
k IBEIi,t-k 4+ 

2004
1998t
t Yeart 
+

48
1j
j Industryj + α4 PR(LOBBYi,t-1) + εj,t, (2a) 
IBEIi,t = α0 + 1β LOBBYi,t-1 + α2MBi,t + α3 ASSETi,t + 

2
1k
k IBEIi,t-k  
+ 

2004
1998t
t Yeart +

48
1j
j Industryj + α4 PR(LOBBYi,t-1) + εj,t, (2b) 
 
For brevity, Table VI reports treatment effects estimates for only the first two 
benchmark specifications (i.e., equations 1a, and 1b), for each of the three measures of firm 
performance. For each specification, the column containing results from the probit regression 
is labeled “Treatment”, and the treatment effect is included as the additional independent 
variable “lobby treatment” for each of the three measures of firm performance. The lobbying 
treatment effect is positive and statistically significant for both specifications examining IBEI 
and NI, which suggests that the impact of lobbying is positive, but biased upward in Table V. 
This is confirmed in the coefficients on lagged lobbying in Table VI, which are roughly sixty 
percent of the size of those presented in Table V.  Importantly however, they remain 
statistically significant in Table VI – though the significance levels decline in all cases. Again, 
these results become weaker in the specifications measuring firm performance using cash from 
operations (CFO) in columns (9) – (12).  
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Interestingly, the test for independence of the treatment equation and the outcome 
equation (e.g., equation (2) and (1)) is significant only for the regressions using Net Income 
(NI), and for equations (9) and (10) for CFO.  Rejecting the null hypothesis of independence 
provides statistical evidence of sample selection. Hence, we find statistically significant 
evidence of sample selection in only half (three out of six) of the specifications in Table VI. 
Thus the evidence for sample selection in the data is mixed.  
We are now in a position to comment on the point estimates of the effects of lobbying 
on financial performance. It is perhaps surprising that the apparent gains have not been bid to 
zero via additional lobbying. However, from a theoretical perspective, Wirl (1994) concludes, 
based on a dynamic model of lobbying that in equilibrium, there will be an apparent under 
investment in lobbying, due to potential retaliation. For example, an implicit threat by a 
dominant firm to raise lobbying expenditures to very high levels would discourage other firms 
from engaging in lobbying. Thus our results are consistent with Wirl’s (1994) theoretical 
prediction. Additionally, this average effect may not apply equally to all firms out of sample - 
given the time, industry, and issue specific nature of lobbying. Finally, we note that these 
estimates ($24 - $44) are in the same ballpark as those reported by de Figueiredo and 
Silverman (2006) in the context of universities lobbying to obtain earmark grants from 
Congressional appropriations committees ($11 - $36). 
To summarize, our results in Table VI are consistent with those presented in Table V, 
and point to a significant and positive association between lobby spending and future financial 
performance as measured by accounting data reported in firms’ financial reports. In the next 
section we turn to market based evidence. That is, we ask whether this positive association is 
present in market-adjusted returns by comparing portfolios of lobbying and non-lobbying firms. 
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This approach also lets us examine the cross-section of firms with non-zero lobbying expenses 
further by explicitly comparing them with portfolios of matched non-lobbying firms.  
4.c. Portfolio based evidence 
To further examine whether lobbying activity is associated with future stock returns 
and whether the stock market correctly anticipates the expected future benefits of lobbying 
spending, we follow Chan et al. (2001) and implement an investment strategy. Specifically, 
this test checks whether lobbying is related to future stock returns and whether firms engaging 
in lobbying activities financially outperform those do not. For these tests we follow Chan et al., 
and construct two measures of lobbying intensity: (a) lobbying expenditures relative to assets, 
and (b) lobbying expenditures relative to market value.  
We include all common stocks listed on the NYSE and Amex, as well as those listed on 
Nasdaq in our sample. Portfolios are formed at the end of March each year, allowing three-
month’s time between the end of a firm’s fiscal year and the public disclosure of its lobbying 
activities for the market to react to the information.25 Stocks of firms that lobby are assigned to 
one of five portfolios based on their ranked lobbying intensity. We keep stocks of non-
lobbying firms in a separate category for comparison.  
We then calculate each portfolio’s average annual buy-and-hold return over each year 
from one to three years after portfolio formation. We also calculate each portfolio’s average 
annual buy-and-hold return in excess of the equally weighted return26 on a control portfolio of 
stocks matched by firm size and book-to-market in the first through third post-formation years. 
                                                 
25 The mandatory corporate filings are disclosed on the Senate website, generally within two months of filing, see 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/database_download.htm 
26 For robustness checks, we also construct value-weighted returns on the control portfolio and the results remain 
little changed.  
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There are six ranks by size and five ranks by book-to-market ratio resulting in 30 control 
portfolios. The ranking by book-to-market is based on quintile breakpoints over all stocks, and 
the size rankings are based on six quantiles of market capitalization. Each stock's return is 
measured net of the buy and-hold return on its control portfolio. 
Table VII reports the returns and characteristics of portfolios classified by lobbying 
expenditure relative to assets.  As shown in Panel C of Table VII, both book-to-market and 
sales-to-market ratios of the firms that lobby are lower than non-lobbying firms. This could 
indicate that firms that lobby have relatively high intangible assets that do not appear on their 
balance sheets, or that such firms are star performers. The earnings-to-price ratio, dividend 
yield and return on equity of lobbying and non-lobbying groups are not significantly different 
from each other. Also, note that firms that lobby tend to be much bigger than non-lobbying 
firms, consistent with Olson (1965).  
Panel A of Table VII reports the raw returns before and after portfolio formation and 
Panel B reports excess returns are calculated after controlling for firm characteristics such as 
size and book-to-market ratio.  It appears that only firms in the highest lobbying intensity 
quintile (group 5) consistently outperform non-lobbying firms once we focus on excess returns.  
The excess returns for the highest lobbying intensity portfolio appear substantial. For instance, 
the average annual return over three-year period after portfolio formation for the highest 
ranked portfolio is 5.5 percent per year, with the highest return in the first year following 
portfolio formation.  The difference in the mean excess returns between the highest ranked 
lobbying intensity quintile and non-lobbying group is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(two-tailed t test = 3.44).  
These results suggest that the stock market does not initially fully incorporate the value 
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of corporate lobbying activities.  If the stock price fully captures the value of a firm’s lobbying 
activities, we would not find an association between lobbying intensity and future stock returns. 
The results also lessen the plausibility of causality running from performance to lobbying 
given that reverse causality would imply that managers accurately forecast profitability (excess 
market returns) three years into the future. 
Table VIII repeats this analysis for portfolios sorted by lobbying expenditures relative 
to market value of equity.27 Results here are similar, though with some nuances; particularly 
for those firms with the highest lobbying intensity. Over the three years prior to portfolio 
formation, the average raw annual return of stocks ranked in the top quintile by lobbying 
relative to market is the lowest (13.91 percent, panel A) across the other four lobbying 
portfolios. In comparison, stocks of firms that do no lobbying have an average return over the 
same period of 22.54 percent per year. The earnings of stocks in quintile 5 are also the lowest 
in the table (Panel C). However, the stocks in the top quintile portfolio perform well in the 
years following portfolio formation. These firms earn a 35.90 percent average raw return in the 
first subsequent year, compared to 29.70 percent for stocks with no lobbying, and the 
difference is more noticeable when comparing excess returns. This indicates possible 
underpricing of actively lobbying firms. In other words, the market may fail to give enough 
credit to past losers that are investing heavily in corporate lobbying.  The average annual 
excess rate of return over the three years following portfolio formation is 6.74 percent for the 
top lobbying quintile, while the non-lobbying firms earn essentially zero average excess 
returns. The difference in the mean excess returns between the two extreme groups is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (two-tailed t test = 4.04). This rebound effect is 
                                                 
27 We also examined the stock returns for portfolios sorted by lobbying expenditures relative to sales. Overall, the 
results support our findings in Tables 8 and 9 and again reveal an association between lobbying intensity and 
future stock returns. 
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something also noted by Chan et al. (2001) for high R&D firms.  
We investigate this rebound effect further in Table IX, using a two-way sort (first by 
lobbying intensity, then by past returns) to capture the influence of both past returns and 
lobbying intensity (measured relative to assets). Specifically, we examine whether past losers 
who spend heavily on lobbying tend to be undervalued. Within each of the portfolios sorted by 
lobbying intensity, we assign a stock to one of two equally sized groups, based on its rate of 
return over the three years prior to portfolio formation. Each stock's return is measured net of 
the return on a control portfolio matched on size, book-to-market, as well as its past three-year 
return. The table reports equally weighted excess returns on each portfolio. Within each 
quintile by lobbying expenditures relative to assets except for group 4, past losers experience 
higher excess return in the first year post portfolio formation than past winners. However, the 
results become weaker in the three-year post portfolio formation period where only past losers 
in groups 2 and 3 outperform past winners. Overall, the results provide evidence of market 
mispricing of lobbying activities.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
There is growing interest in the political activities of corporations. To date, the 
overwhelming focus of the financial press and research among academics is on corporate 
political contributions. Contributions however, account for only a small part of corporate 
political activities – which are not corporate expenses at all since they are, in fact, made by 
individuals. We document that lobbying expenses are by far the largest form of corporate 
political activity in the United States. Measured by number of firms engaged, or by dollar 
amounts spent, lobbying activities far outweigh corporate PAC or the (now banned) corporate 
soft-money donations. Moreover, this paper uses lobbying data that became publicly available 
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after the passing of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine the financial implications 
of this dominant category of corporate political activity.  
We present several findings on the relation between corporate financial performance 
and lobbying. First, based on a pooled regression including all firms (i.e., those with zero and 
those with positive lobbying spending) we find evidence that lobbying expenditures are on 
average positively correlated with financial performance. We report several robustness and 
sensitivity analyses, including various measures of financial performance and alternative 
empirical specifications. Our results appear robust to several different empirical specifications, 
and several measures of financial performance. We also report results from estimating an 
explicit model of sample selection. Results from this exercise are consistently positive and 
continue to support the conclusion that lobbying expenditures are statistically significantly 
positively correlated with financial performance. 
Some of the more interesting findings appear when we take a portfolio approach. Here, 
we compare returns of firms that lobby based on their lobbying intensity, to the returns 
generated by portfolios of non-lobbying firms. We find that portfolios of firms with the high 
lobbying intensities outperform their benchmarks of non-lobbying firms. We also show that 
increases in lobbying tend to follow poor performance, but what we observe is not simply a 
mean reversion in returns. Firms with the highest lobbying intensity outperform other firms 
with similar mean reversion in returns. 
Many articles in the financial press suggest that the returns to lobbying are large. Our 
portfolio results suggest an answer to the natural follow-up question to such news stories, i.e., 
what keeps even more firms from engaging in lobbying activities? Our analysis of firm-level 
lobbying data suggests that, in fact, most firms do not enjoy superior financial performance as 
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a result of lobbying. Specifically, we find that only firms that have been willing to commit to 
the highest lobbying intensities have outperformed their peers. Firms in this category earned an 
excess return of 5.5% over the three years following portfolio formation, while the rest of the 
firms earned essentially a zero excess return. Clearly, not all firms can be in the top-intensity 
group. Additionally, the relative opacity of lobbying disclosures may have historically 
obscured its benefits, which suggests that going forward we should expect apparent rents to be 
dissipated via either greater lobbying spending among all participants, or by new entrants. 
Finally, our portfolio results are consistent with defensive lobbying, i.e., lobbying designed to 
limit negative outcomes, by a substantial fraction of our sample firms since the majority of 
firms appear to earn low or even negative returns to their lobbying activity. 
While our results do not uniquely identify lobbying for defensive reasons versus 
preemptive lobbying, the approach does identify successful firms as those lobbying more 
intensively. We also document that the excess returns of lobbying-intensive firms diminish as 
time goes by, suggesting that lobbying has its greatest effects in the short term. One 
explanation for these results is a lack of transparency in lobbying disclosure; that is, despite the 
availability of lobbying data in U.S. Senate filings, it is not currently in a user-friendly (e.g., 
with standard alphanumeric firm identifiers) electronic form. 
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Figure 1: Total and Average Annual Lobbying Spending in the period of 1998-2005 
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Table I:    Top 20 Lobbying Spenders in 2005 (in $millions) 
 
Variable definitions: Assets = total assets; Sales = net sales; IBEI = income before extraordinary items; lobbying spending = lobbying expenditures. 
       Lobbying  
 Rank Company Name Industry Assets Sales IBEI Spending 
1 General Electric Conglomerates 673,342 148,019 18,275 18.77 
2 Altria Group Cigarettes 107,949 68,920 10,668 13.64 
3 Northrop Grumman Search, detection, navigation,  34214 30721 1383 13.60 
  guidance, aeronautical systems 
4 Southern Co Electric services 39,877 13,554 1,621 12.96 
5 Boeing Co Aircraft 60,058 54,845 2,562 9.24 
6 AIG  Life insurance 853,370 108,340 10,477 8.50 
7 General Motors Motor vehicles & car bodies 476,078 190,215 -10,458 7.76 
8 Motorola Inc Radio, TV broadcast,  35,649 36,843 4,599 7.59 
  communication equipment 
9 Lockheed Martin Guided missiles & space vehicles  27,744 37,213 1,825 7.34 
  & parts 
10 Exxon Mobil Petroleum refining 208,335 328,213 36,130 7.02 
11 Verizon Communications Telephone communications  168,130 75,112 7,397 6.76 
  except radiotelephone 
12 Pfizer Inc Pharmaceutical Preparations 117,565 51,298 8,094 6.49 
13 Amgen Inc Biological products except 29,297 12,430 3,674 5.72 
  diagnostic substances 
14 Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical Preparations 58,025 50,514 10,411 5.38 
15 DaimlerChrysler Motor vehicles & car bodies 238,773 177,365 3,376 5.34 
16 ConocoPhillips Petroleum refining 106,999 162,405 13,640 5.10 
17 Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical 28,138 19,207 2,992 5.04 
18 GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceutical 46,748 37,855 8,059 4.86 
19 SBC Communications Telephone communications  145,632 43,862 4,786 4.84 
  except radiotelephone 
20 Ford Motor Co Motor vehicles & car bodies 269,476 177,089 2,228 4.80 
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Table II:    Three Categories of Corporate Political Involvement 
 
 
Panel A: Lobbying Activities (Annual amounts)    
Year # of firms Mean ($) 
Std Dev 
(million $)  Min ($)
Max 
(million $)
# of firms in 
Compustat  
% of firms in  
Compustat 
that lobby
1998 704 554,628 1.40 10,000 23 10765 6.54%
1999 765 521,482 1.23 10,000 14.7 10795 7.09%
2000 759 540,833 1.25 10,000 16 10347 7.34%
2001 796 539,003 1.24 10,000 15.4 9745 8.17%
2002 823 547,894 1.23 10,000 14 9292 8.86%
2003 925 549,761 1.28 10,000 17 9024 10.25%
2004 943 576,744 1.35 10,000 17.2 8716 10.82%
2005 963 581,447 1.41 10,000 18.8 8167 11.79%
     
Panel B: PAC Contributions (Election Cycle amounts)   
        
Year # of firms Mean ($) 
Std Dev 
(million $)  Min ($)
Max 
(million $)   
1998 430 84,618 0.14 350 1.5   
2000 487 94,036 0.16 125 1.8   
2002 509 106,190 0.18 200 1.6   
2004 527 127,146 0.22 150 2.1   
        
Panel C: Soft-Money Contributions (Election Cycle amounts)   
        
Year # of firms Mean ($) 
Std Dev 
(million $)  Min ($)
Max 
(million $)   
1998 324 116,607 0.21 250 2.4   
2000 420 197,834 0.34 220 2.4   
2002 423 195,574 0.38 250 2.9   
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Table III:    Average Lobby Spending by Industry Group and Year 
This table reports data from the Center for Responsive Politics. The CRP data includes lobbying, PAC, 
and soft-money contributions as distinct categories. CRP reports lobbying expenses by calendar year 
and both PAC and soft-money contributions by election cycle 
 
2-digit  
SICa Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
 
01-09 Agriculture, 0.200 0.230 0.502 0.139 0.319 0.397 0.476 0.589 0.357 
 forestry & fishing (2)b (5) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
 
10-19 Mining & 0.410 0.403 0.420 0.329 0.376 0.253 0.284 0.269 0.343 
 construction (28) (30) (31) (33) (36) (45) (42) (43) (36) 
 
20-29 Manufacturing 0.725 0.765 0.693 0.657 0.738 0.656 0.671 0.744 0.706 
  (141) (147) (150) (152) (144) (163) (166) (175) (155) 
 
30-39 Manufacturing 0.628 0.530 0.548 0.528 0.484 0.480 0.494 0.481 0.522 
  (156) (164) (162) (175) (200) (226) (238) (234) (194) 
 
40-49 Transportation & 0.494 0.495 0.519 0.507 0.554 0.628 0.672 0.663 0.567 
 utilities (159) (166) (163) (167) (160) (158) (150) (150) (159) 
 
50-59 Wholesale & retail 0.215 0.208 0.235 0.487 0.242 0.297 0.293 0.301 0.285 
  (38) (40) (46) (42) (38) (42) (45) (51) (43) 
 
60-69 Finance, insurance 0.671 0.567 0.615 0.673 0.830 0.837 0.893 0.878 0.745 
 & real estate (91) (107) (100) (103) (103) (128) (125) (120) (110) 
 
70-79 Personal & 0.331 0.318 0.344 0.350 0.320 0.335 0.381 0.382 0.345 
 business services (54) (64) (70) (83) (90) (100) (107) (114) (85) 
 
80-89 Healthcare & 0.132 0.122 0.195 0.201 0.190 0.200 0.268 0.310 0.202 
 other services (29) (34) (27) (31) (40) (52) (57) (63) (42) 
 
90-99 Public 2.395 1.591 5.353 3.883 2.608 4.301 3.864 3.936 3.491 
 administration (3) (5) (3) (4) (5) (4) (5) (5) (4) 
 
aSIC classification is from the U.S. Department of Labor at http://www.osha.gov 
bNumber of firms is in parenthesis. 
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Table IV     Descriptive Statistics  
(Firms with fiscal years ending in December) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Firms with non-zero lobbying spending
IBEI 4,400 507.86 1,977.71 -25,779.47 36,130.00 
NI 4,400 501.72 2,014.38 -25,779.47 36,130.00 
CFO 4,272 1,111.21 3,500.09 -25,658.00 78,470.00 
ASSET 4,402 25,904.71 100,906.42 0.00 1,494,037.00 
LOBBY 4,676 0.64 1.40 0.01 18.77 
MB 3,963 4.83 114.42 -656.93 7,071.35 
PRICE 4,108 35.27 71.84 0.00 1,522.00 
RETURN 3,292 0.14 0.63 -0.94 4.16 
∆IBEI 3,234 56.19 1,487.24 -26,472.00 27,357.87 
∆NI 3,234 62.31 1,525.00 -26,213.00 27,357.87 
∆CFO 3,143 134.68 1,915.67 -44,739.00 36,706.00 
∆LOBBY 3,461 0.04 0.63 -7.55 11.39 
 
Panel B: All Compustat firms    
IBEI 53,685 108.10 924.44 -44,574.00 36,130.00 
NI 53,686 104.43 1,106.18 -98,696.00 36,130.00 
CFO 47,362 274.95 1,734.79 -48,073.47 102,999.81 
ASSET 53,806 6,771.52 50,490.00 0.00 1,588,784.81 
MB 45,685 3.55 169.50 -11,100.00 24,950.20 
PRICE 57,929 29.85 970.03 0.00 88,620.00 
RETURN 43,798 0.16 1.08 -0.98 9.00 
∆IBEI 43,256 14.33 755.40 -39,679.00 47,720.00 
∆NI 43,255 12.49 1,108.52 -93,775.00 101,335.00 
∆CFO 38,180 24.42 1,051.23 -69,093.23 47,370.00 
 
Variable definitions: 
 IBEI  = income before extraordinary items, in $millions; 
 NI  = net income, in $millions; 
 CFO = cash from operations, in $millions; 
 ASSET = total assets at the beginning of year t, in $millions; 
 LOBBY = annual lobbying spending, in $millions; 
 MB  = market-to-book ratio at the end of the year; 
 PRICE = share price at three months after the end of year t;  
 RETURN  = change of market value from three months after the end of year t-1 to three months after the end of 
year t, deflated by market value at three months after the end of year t-1;  
 ∆IBEI  = change in income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t; 
 ∆NI  = change in net income from year t-1 to year t; 
 ∆CFO = change in cash from operations from year t-1 to year t; 
 ∆LOBBY = change in lobbying expenditures from year t-1 to year t; 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES IBEI ΔIBEI ΔIBEI NI ΔNI ΔNI CFO ΔCFO ΔCFO
lobbyt-1 76.528*** 32.701*** 73.958*** 45.206*** 33.349** 15.579
(7.122) (3.224) (5.507) (3.485) (2.376) (1.090)
assets 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.005** 0.004*** 0.004***
(6.975) (4.739) (5.170) (4.477) (2.171) (2.423) (2.353) (3.475) (3.760)
market-to-book ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.391) (-0.222) (-0.154) (-0.799) (-0.698) (-0.665) (-0.309) (-1.266) (-1.240)
dependent variablet-1 0.642*** -0.188*** -0.183*** 0.562*** -0.393*** -0.388*** 0.664*** -0.351*** -0.351***
(26.604) (-6.921) (-6.602) (24.205) (-15.252) (-14.932) (23.698) (-11.455) (-11.473)
dependent variablet-2 0.192*** -0.307*** -0.300*** 0.206*** -0.198*** -0.195*** 0.269*** -0.149*** -0.150***
(7.125) (-11.564) (-11.224) (9.291) (-7.804) (-7.637) (9.616) (-6.439) (-6.438)
∆lobbyt-1 4.644 24.313 20.687
(0.159) (0.976) (0.772)
Observations 30622 23308 23308 29524 22289 22289 25849 19585 19585
Number of clusters 7406 6275 6275 7280 6098 6098 6344 5350 5350
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared (between) 0.866 0.0424 0.0395 0.821 0.0245 0.0192 0.925 0.0373 0.0362
R-squared (within) 0.0952 0.195 0.193 0.0812 0.221 0.219 0.111 0.217 0.217
R-squared (overall) 0.748 0.115 0.111 0.720 0.116 0.111 0.837 0.0969 0.0966
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance. Firm performance is measured by: IBEI = income before
extraordinary items in year t; ∆IBEI = change in income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t; NI = net income in year t; ∆NI = change in net
income from year t-1 to year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t; ∆CFO = change in cash from operations from year t-1 to year t. Independent
variables are: LOBBY = lobbying relative to assets in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total assets at the beginning of the
year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-
2005. Two-tailed z-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the
regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table V Panel Regression of Firm Performance on Lobby Spending
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES IBEI Treatment ∆IBEI Treatment NI Treatment ∆NI Treatment CFO Treatment ∆CFO Treatment
lobbyt-1 44.30779*** 23.77831** 44.66838*** 34.84049*** 14.14707 12.62436
(4.860) (2.448) (3.916) (3.118) (1.054) (0.880)
assets 0.00150*** 0.00000* 0.00123*** 0.00001*** 0.00148*** 0.00000 0.00104*** 0.00001*** 0.00312** 0.00001* 0.00399*** 0.00006***
(6.994) (1.706) (4.836) (5.493) (4.005) (1.610) (2.688) (3.822) (2.452) (1.717) (3.140) (6.147)
market-to-book ratio -0.00154 0.00016* -0.00169 0.00014 -0.00309 0.00016* -0.00501 0.00015 -0.00051 0.00015 -0.00206 0.00014
(-0.771) (1.698) (-0.568) (1.457) (-0.830) (1.645) (-0.832) (1.462) (-0.541) (1.471) (-1.457) (1.318)
lobby treatment 22.04128*** 18.87645*** 11.56226** 8.21073* 1.06709 -1.34994
(3.810) (3.136) (2.532) (1.743) (0.215) (-0.209)
dependent variablet-1 0.72275*** 0.00069*** -0.28592*** 0.00036*** 0.68623*** 0.00097*** -0.31773*** 0.00052*** 0.72457***0.00071*** -0.30574***0.00030**
(29.901) (10.425) (-10.637) (4.395) (30.279) (10.737) (-11.872) (3.694) (27.052) (8.751) (-9.668) (2.357)
dependent variablet-2 0.20931*** 0.00040*** -0.16867*** 0.00023*** 0.23106*** 0.00072*** -0.14141*** 0.00034** 0.27206***0.00076*** -0.11540***0.00031**
(8.148) (5.612) (-5.952) (2.890) (10.142) (7.259) (-5.457) (2.543) (10.245) (8.572) (-4.765) (2.442)
Import share 0.09034 0.11679 0.03439 0.058227 0.086959 0.13264*
(1.097) (1.394) (0.395) (0.619) (1.139) (1.721)
Import growth -0.00002 0.00001 0.000006 0.00030 0.00027 0.000974
-(0.124) (0.0625) (0.037) (0.157) (0.180) (0.664)
Number of firms lobbying in industry 0.00140*** 0.001573*** 0.001309*** 0.00003*** 0.00151*** 0.001818**
(2.739) (2.904) (2.612) (2.909) (3.358) (3.684)
Observations 28812 28812 21922 21922 27760 27760 20950 20950 24161 24161 18295 18295
number of clusters 6982 6982 5915 5915 6859 6859 5744 5744 5944 5944 5011 5011
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wald Test of independent equation 0.0193 0.0193 0.187 0.187 5.089 5.089 3.878 3.878 46.38 46.38 0.566 0.566
significance level 0.890 0.890 0.665 0.665 0.0241 0.0241 0.0489 0.0489 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.452 0.452
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table VI Selection Bias: Treatment Effects Models
This table reports estimates of a simultaneous two equation system: the decision to lobby is estimated via a probit model, and the relationship between lobbying and firm performance in the second equation. Import share is
defined as the share of imports in industry i's shipments in 1994. Import growth is the growth of sector i's imports over the longest interval for which we have data duering the period 1958-1994. The number of firms lobbying 
in industry i is the simple count of firms in industry i with positive lobbying expenditures in year t-1. The dependent variables are: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; ∆IBEI = change in income before
extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t; NI = net income in year t; ∆NI = change in net income from year t-1 to year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t; ∆CFO = change in cash from operations from year t-1 to year t.
Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying relative to assets in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. All models are estimated by maximum likelihood estimates with two-tailed z-statistics (adjusted for clustering at
the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table VII   Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Classified  
by Lobbying Expenditure Relative to Assets 
The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT files. In Panel A, each portfolio's average annual buy-and-hold return is reported over the 
three years prior to portfolio formation; over each year from one to three years after portfolio formation; 
and averaged over the three years after portfolio formation. Panel B reports each portfolio's average return 
in excess of the equally weighted return on a control portfolio of stocks matched by firm size and book-to-
market in the first through third years. Panel C reports characteristics of the portfolios: the average number 
of component stocks; the ratios of lobbying expenditures to assets, to sales, and to market value of equity; 
book value of equity relative to market value of equity; sales relative to market value of equity; earnings 
relative to price; annual dividends divided by market value of equity; return on equity (earnings divided by 
the prior year's book value of equity); and the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars. 
 
Rank 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 
Non-
Lobbying 
Panel A: Returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
   period before portfolio formation 0.1681 0.1495 0.1798 0.2653 0.2353 0.2254 
First year after portfolio formation 0.1148 0.1601 0.1396 0.2088 0.3277 0.2970 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.1842 0.1612 0.2350 0.1703 0.2488 0.2480 
Third year after portfolio formation 0.1491 0.1923 0.1680 0.1714 0.2278 0.2419 
Average annual return over 3-year    
  period after portfolio formation 0.1494 0.1712 0.1809 0.1835 0.2681 0.2623 
Panel B: Excess returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
   period before portfolio formation -0.0381 -0.0761 -0.0588 -0.0071 -0.0514 0.0060 
First year after portfolio formation -0.0263 0.0160 -0.0112 0.0481 0.1083 -0.0035 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.0200 -0.0123 0.0641 0.0003 0.0230 -0.0025 
Third year after portfolio formation -0.0142 0.0215 -0.0031 0.0036 0.0349 -0.0011 
Average annual return over 3-year  
   period after portfolio formation -0.0068 0.0084 0.0166 0.0173 0.0554 -0.0024 
Panel C: Characteristics of Portfolios 
Average number of observations 485 491 490 491 488 18,834 
Lobby spending relative to assets 0.0006% 0.0025% 0.0067% 0.0149% 0.1151% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to sales 0.0023% 0.0049% 0.0160% 0.1305% 0.3712% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to market 
value 0.0021% 0.0052% 0.0111% 0.0223% 0.1021% 0% 
Book-to-market 0.5405 0.5363 0.5288 0.5020 0.4849 0.7120 
Sales-to-market 1.2345 1.4492 1.3465 1.2013 1.3486 1.9370 
Earnings-to-price -0.0070 0.0001 0.0076 0.0111 -0.0767 -0.0796 
Dividend yield 0.0200 0.0171 0.0177 0.0171 0.0083 0.0161 
Return on equity  0.0984 0.0957 0.2068 0.1316 0.0988 0.0868 
Log Assets 9.3298 8.5327 8.2146 7.9626 6.0142 5.5051 
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Table VIII   Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Classified  
by Lobbying Expenditure Relative to Market Value 
The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT files. In Panel A, each portfolio's average annual buy-and-hold return is reported over the 
three years prior to portfolio formation; over each year from one to three years after portfolio formation; 
and averaged over the three years after portfolio formation. Panel B reports each portfolio's average return 
in excess of the equally weighted return on a control portfolio of stocks matched by firm size and book-to-
market in the first through third years. Panel C reports characteristics of the portfolios: the average number 
of component stocks; the ratios of lobbying expenditures to assets, to sales, and to market value of equity; 
book value of equity relative to market value of equity; sales relative to market value of equity; earnings 
relative to price; annual dividends divided by market value of equity; return on equity (earnings divided by 
the prior year's book value of equity); and the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars. 
 
Rank 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 
Non-
Lobbying 
Panel A: Returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period before portfolio formation 0.2578 0.2490 0.1815 0.1712 0.1391 0.2254 
First year after portfolio formation 0.0800 0.1255 0.1614 0.2249 0.3590 0.2970 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.1414 0.1594 0.1808 0.2150 0.3026 0.2480 
Third year after portfolio formation 0.1148 0.1479 0.1633 0.1981 0.2844 0.2419 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period after portfolio formation 0.1120 0.1443 0.1685 0.2127 0.3153 0.2623 
Panel B: Excess returns before and after portfolio formation 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period before portfolio formation -0.0199 -0.0191 -0.0723 -0.0558 -0.0643 0.0060 
First year after portfolio formation -0.0307 -0.0016 0.0268 0.0533 0.0870 -0.0035 
Second year after portfolio 
formation 0.0087 0.0082 0.0063 0.0187 0.0534 -0.0025 
Third year after portfolio formation -0.0262 -0.0094 0.0013 0.0153 0.0617 -0.0011 
Average annual return over 3-year  
    period after portfolio formation -0.0161 -0.0009 0.0114 0.0291 0.0674 -0.0024 
Panel C: Characteristics of Portfolios 
Average number of observations 485 491 490 491 488 18,834 
Lobby spending relative to assets 0.0016% 0.0051% 0.0097% 0.0197% 0.1035% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to sales 0.0037% 0.0139% 0.0635% 0.0804% 0.3613% 0% 
Lobby spending relative to market 
value 0.0008% 0.0030% 0.0072% 0.0175% 0.1144% 0% 
Book-to-market 0.3561 0.4007 0.4683 0.5867 0.7801 0.7120 
Sales-to-market 0.7443 0.9177 1.1169 1.5498 2.2504 1.9370 
Earnings-to-price 0.0280 -0.0026 0.0120 -0.0098 -0.0922 -0.0796 
Dividend yield 0.0146 0.0137 0.0167 0.0176 0.0174 0.0161 
Return on equity  0.1977 0.0978 0.1400 0.0588 0.1385 0.0868 
Log Assets 9.6101 8.9058 8.2617 7.5269 5.7513 5.5051 
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Table IX   Excess Returns of Portfolios Classified by Lobbying Expenditure  
Relative to Assets and by Past 3-year Return 
The sample includes all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT files. All stocks with lobbying expenditures are ranked by lobbying expenditures 
relative to assets, and assigned to one of five equally sized portfolios. Within each of the five 
portfolios, stocks are further ranked by their rates of return over the prior three years and 
subdivided into two equally sized groups. The table reports each portfolio's average excess return 
over each of the first three years following portfolio formation and over all three years after 
portfolio formation. Excess returns are computed relative to a control portfolio of stocks based on 
size and book-to-market and then past three-year return. The excess return is the difference between 
the stock's annual buy-and-hold return and the return on the control portfolio.  
 
Ranked by 
  
Excess Return in Year  
after Portfolio Formation  Average Excess Return 
over 3 Post-formation 
Years 
Lobby spending  
relative to 
assets 
Past 3-year  
return   
First  
Year
Second 
Year
Third 
Year  
1(Low) 1(Low)  -0.0260 -0.0037 -0.0141  -0.0146 
 2(High)  -0.0265 0.0435 -0.0142  0.0009 
2 1  0.0063 0.0393 0.0276  0.0244 
 2  0.0257 -0.0632 0.0154  -0.0074 
3 1  -0.0100 0.0804 0.0002  0.0235 
 2  -0.0124 0.0482 -0.0064  0.0098 
4 1  0.0118 0.0004 -0.0086  0.0012 
 2  0.0840 0.0003 0.0155  0.0333 
5(High) 1(Low)  0.1155 -0.0081 0.0116  0.0397 
  2(High)   0.1012 0.0539 0.0581  0.0710 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES IBEI ΔIBEI ΔIBEI NI ΔNI ΔNI CFO ΔCFO ΔCFO
lobbyt-1 77.516*** 32.665*** 75.856*** 45.124*** 35.076** 13.996
(6.956) (3.030) (5.283) (3.295) (2.388) (0.879)
assets 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005***
(6.753) (4.344) (4.737) (4.405) (1.958) (2.193) (2.206) (3.247) (3.496)
market-to-book ratio 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.210) (0.831) (0.836) (0.338) (0.860) (0.864) (0.118) (-0.341) (-0.345)
dependent variablet-1 0.624*** -0.345*** -0.339*** 0.543*** -0.405*** -0.399*** 0.690*** -0.345*** -0.346***
(23.222) (-11.573) (-11.295) (20.740) (-13.920) (-13.622) (21.698) (-9.109) (-9.131)
dependent variablet-2 0.200*** -0.208*** -0.204*** 0.200*** -0.200*** -0.197*** 0.252*** -0.154*** -0.155***
(6.437) (-6.900) (-6.639) (7.928) (-6.493) (-6.351) (7.931) (-5.869) (-5.868)
∆lobbyt-1 -8.402 26.221 22.627
(-0.256) (0.933) (0.708)
Observations 28277 21444 21444 27371 20615 20615 23693 17883 17883
Number of clusters 7120 6016 6016 6993 5845 5845 6065 5098 5098
industry dummies
time dummies
R-squared (between) 0.863 0.0563 0.0508 0.809 0.0395 0.0332 0.928 0.0424 0.0420
R-squared (within) 0.0806 0.203 0.203 0.0677 0.220 0.217 0.113 0.202 0.202
R-squared (overall) 0.746 0.124 0.120 0.708 0.120 0.115 0.841 0.0890 0.0889
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix Table 1 Panel Regression of Firm Performance on Lobby Spending: Largest Lobbying Spenders
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance, focusing on firms with the highest lobbying expenditures (top
quartile). Firm performance is measured by: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t; ∆IBEI = change in income before extraordinary items from
year t-1 to year t; NI = net income in year t; ∆NI = change in net income from year t-1 to year t; CFO = cash from operations in year t; ∆CFO = change in
cash from operations from year t-1 to year t. Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying relative to assets in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the
end of year t; ASSET = total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the
CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. Two-tailed z-statistics (adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under
the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES IBEI ΔIBEI ΔIBEI NI ΔNI ΔNI CFO ΔCFO ΔCFO
lobbyt-1 66.445*** 24.190* 77.307*** 52.099*** 19.308 -3.771
(5.277) (1.668) (4.708) (3.645) (1.116) (-0.221)
assets 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004***
(6.179) (3.538) (3.757) (3.959) (1.809) (1.975) (2.059) (2.910) (2.936)
market-to-book ratio -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.280) (0.348) (0.325) (-0.158) (0.351) (0.317) (0.525) (0.084) (0.093)
dependent variablet-1 0.654*** -0.310*** -0.303*** 0.571*** -0.405*** -0.403*** 0.649*** -0.385*** -0.385***
(24.302) (-10.761) (-10.526) (21.342) (-13.299) (-13.223) (20.471) (-10.147) (-10.162)
dependent variablet-2 0.204*** -0.178*** -0.173*** 0.213*** -0.222*** -0.222*** 0.307*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(7.569) (-6.225) (-6.054) (8.099) (-7.354) (-7.308) (9.475) (-5.183) (-5.193)
∆lobbyt-1 0.995 2.921 8.961
(0.023) (0.132) (0.272)
Observations 25683 19435 19435 24903 18714 18714 21539 16221 16221
Number of clusters 6771 5720 5720 6645 5563 5563 5784 4865 4865
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared (between) 0.849 0.0219 0.0218 0.810 0.0328 0.0256 0.911 0.0407 0.0408
R-squared (within) 0.107 0.205 0.203 0.0639 0.241 0.240 0.106 0.248 0.248
R-squared (overall) 0.755 0.102 0.101 0.704 0.126 0.120 0.838 0.104 0.104
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix Table 2 Panel Regression of Firm Performance on Lobby Spending among firms with Low Investor Protection
This table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between lobbying and firm performance, focusing on firms with relatively weak corporate governance
(top quartile of E-index) as measured by Bebchuk, et al., (2009). Firm performance is measured by: IBEI = income before extraordinary items in year t;
∆IBEI = change in income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t; NI = net income in year t; ∆NI = change in net income from year t-1 to year
t; CFO = cash from operations in year t; ∆CFO = change in cash from operations from year t-1 to year t. Independent variables are: LOBBY = lobbying
relative to assets in year t-1; MB = market-to-book ratio at the end of year t; ASSET = total assets at the beginning of the year t. The sample includes all
stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq with coverage on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT files annually, for the years 1998-2005. Two-tailed z-statistics
(adjusted for clustering at the firm level) in the parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate the regression coefficients are
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
 
